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FROM SPECIALITY TO A CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE OF
PURPOSE: ON THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE OBJECTIVES
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
JORIS LARIK*
Abstract After the Lisbon Treaty, the objectives of the European Union are
more numerous and ambitious than ever. But what is their importance and
function within the ‘thickening’ legal order of the EU? Combining insights
from both the law of international organizations and comparative consti-
tutional law, the article traces the diverging role of objectives for, on the
one hand, a traditional international organization marked by the principle of
‘speciality’ and, on the other, a maturing legal order increasingly exhibiting
‘constitutional’ traits. It argues that in the case of the EU, objectives and
competences have developed into two related but distinct norm categories.
While objectives serve to bolster arguments to shape such powers, they
no longer represent a rationale in their own right for founding competences.
The EU no longer justiﬁes its existence solely by striving for a particular set
of goals. Rather, these norms represent an entrenched duty to pursue these
objectives through the actors, structures and procedures available, regardless
of the Union’s ultimate form ( ﬁnalité). Today, the EU stands for certain
values and has been endowed with powers, the exercise of which is guided
by promoting these various aspects of the ‘common good’.
Keywords: comparative constitutional law, conferral, constitutionalization, ﬁnalité,
ﬂexibility clause, law of international organizations, objectives of the European Union,
principle of speciality, teleological interpretation, ultra vires.
I. INTRODUCTION
When reading through the EU Treaties after the Lisbon reform, EU citizens—
and perhaps even the world at large—could rejoice in the many promises
enshrined therein and await their realization with pleasant anticipation. After
all, the Union boldly states as its overall aim ‘to promote peace, its values and
the well-being of its peoples’.1 This includes, internally, oﬀering an ‘area of
freedom, security and justice’2 as well as an economically prosperous and
competitive internal market.3 Regarding ‘its relations with the wider world’,
* Senior Researcher, The Hague Institute for Global Justice, j.larik@TheHagueInstitute.org;
and Associate Fellow, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, KU Leuven,
joris.larik@ggs.kuleuven.be.
1 Art 3(1) EU. 2 Art 3(2) TEU. 3 Art 3(3), ﬁrst subpara TEU.
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the EU vows to contribute to, among a number of other things, ‘the sustainable
development of the Earth’, ‘free and fair trade’, ‘eradication of poverty and
the protection of human rights’, and ‘the strict observance and the development
of international law’.4
Whatever one may think of these goals as political desiderata, and
however optimistic (or not) one may see the chances of them being lived up
to, a legal question imposes itself which the present article seeks to answer
by harnessing insights from both the law of international organizations
and comparative constitutional law: what place do these objectives—as norms
codiﬁed in EU primary law—assume within the Union legal order?
The argument advanced here is that this position is now markedly diﬀerent
from that of the tasks enshrined in the original European Communities,
and even the pre-Lisbon Community and Union, due to the maturing nature
of the EU’s legal order. In essence, today more objectives do not equal more
power—much less the need for a complete revamping of the Union’s power
structure and nature. Rather, they entail more obligations and guidance for the
exercise of power.
Scholarly interest in Union objectives has dwindled in recent years,
undisturbed by the surge in literature on the Lisbon Treaty.5 This is surprising
for at least two reasons. First, the objectives of the Union and its predecessors
have proliferated considerably with each round of treaty reform, and ﬁgured
as a topic of vivid discussion at the Convention on the Future of Europe
4 Art 3(5) TEU. In addition to these general objectives of the EU, the Treaties contain
numerous policy speciﬁc objectives pertaining to, for instance, its environmental policy (art 191(1)
TFEU), external action (art 21 TEU), and as a part of the latter, its trade (art 206 TFEU) and
development policies (art 208 TFEU).
5 Notable analyses, albeit many now dated, include H-J Glaesner, ‘Les objectifs de la
Communauté économique européenne: origine et développements’ in L’Europe et le droit:
Mélanges en hommage à Jean Boulouis (Dalloz 1991) 285; C Calliess, ‘Kollektive Ziele und
Prinzipien im Verfassungsrecht der EU: Bestandsaufnahme, Wirkungen und Perspektiven’ (2003)
92 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (Beiheft) 85; F Reimer, ‘Ziele und Zuständigkeiten:
Die Funktionen der Unionszielbestimmungen’ (2003) Europarecht 992; M Kotzur, ‘Die Ziele der
Union: Verfassungsidentität und Gemeinschaftsidee’ (2005) 58 Die öﬀentliche Verwaltung 313;
F Sorrentino, ‘The purposes of the European Union according to the Constitutional Treaty’ in
HJ Blanke and S Mangiameli (eds), Governing Europe under a Constitution: The Hard Road
from the European Treaties to a European Constitutional Treaty (Springer 2006) 123; and
W Drescher, ‘Ziele und Zuständigkeiten’ in A Marchetti and C Demesmay (eds), Der Vertrag
von Lissabon: Analyse und Bewertung (Nomos 2010) 59. Note, however, the analysis of the
Treaty articles on Union objectives in German(-style) and French commentaries, eg
K-P Sommermann, ‘Article 3 [The Objectives of the European Union]’ in HJ Blanke and
S Mangiameli (eds), The Treaty on European Union (TEU): A Commentary (Springer 2013)
157; PC Müller-Graﬀ, ‘Verfassungsziele der Europäischen Union’ in M Dauses, Handbuch des
EU-Wirtschaftsrechts (loose-leaf commentary, 33rd edn, CH Beck, September 2013);
M Pechstein, ‘Art. 3 (ex-Art. 2 EUV) [Ziele der Union]’ in R Streinz (ed), EUV/AEUV:
Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen
Union (2nd edn, CH Beck 2012) 18; and F-X Priollaud and D Siritzky, Le Traité de Lisbonne:
Texte et commentaire article par article des nouveaux traités Européens (TUE-TFUE)
(La Documentation Française 2008) 35–6.
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of 2002/03.6 Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the
EU Treaties exhibit more numerous and audacious goals than ever before.
Second, in national constitutional scholarship of certain major jurisdictions,
animated debates have taken place on such objectives as constitutional norms,
yielding a number of authoritative treatises on the subject.7 In the United States,
the constitution of which does not include explicitly state objectives, voices
have been raised nonetheless for a ‘redemptionist’ or ‘aspirationalist’8 approach
to constitutional interpretation. According to these scholars, constitutions also
expound, in addition to existing institutional structures and individual rights,
‘a set of principles that critiques present political arrangements and that
we must try to realise over time’.9 Strikingly, in the course of the ‘Eurocrisis’,
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance obliges its parties to
include, preferably in their constitutions, commitments to keep their public debt
in check.10 Such ‘Golden Rules’ are none other, in form and function, than
constitutional objectives obliging States to strive for a balanced budget.11
Hence, objectives, at both the national and EU level, are on the rise in
constitutional design. The present article aims to revive and develop further the
scholarship on EU objectives by bringing to bear the scholarship on national
constitutional objectives, positing that it is better suited for the Union legal
order than the appraisal of ‘tasks’ of international organizations hailing from
public international law scholarship.
Thus, in order to come to terms with such prominent norms in the highest
laws of the post-Lisbon EU, an appropriate starting point is the idea of
Zielbedarf, coined in 1972 by Hans Peter Ipsen.12 This concept translates
literally to the ‘need for objectives’, which according to Ipsen was an inherent
6 P Norman, The Accidental Constitution: The Story of the European Convention (2nd edn,
EuroComment 2005) 65; and A Pilette and E de Poncins, ‘Valeurs, objectifs et nature de l’Union’
in G Amato, H Bribosia and B de Witte (eds), Genesis and Destiny of the European Constitution
(Bruylant 2007) 287, 298.
7 For Germany, see K-P Sommermann, Staatsziele und Staatszielbestimmungen (Mohr
Siebeck 1997); for France, see P De Montalivet, Les objectifs de valeur constitutionnelle (Dalloz
2006); for India, see N Kumar, Judiciary on Goals of Governance: Directive Principles of State
Policy (Anamika Publishers 2005); or O Chinnappa Reddy, The Court and the Constitution of
India: Summits and Shallows (OUP 2010) ch 9.
8 See R West, ‘The Aspirational Constitution’ (1993) 88 NorthwestULRev 241; M Dorf, ‘The
Aspirational Constitution’ (2009) 77 GeoWashLRev 1631.
9 J Balkin, ‘Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption’ (2007) 24 Constitutional
Commentary 427, 464; further J Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust
World (Harvard University Press 2011).
10 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, signed 2 March 2012 and entered into
force on 1 January 2013, <http://european-council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf>
art 3.
11 See amended constitutional provisions such as art 109 of the German Basic Law, art 135 of
the Spanish constitution or art 81 of the Italian constitution, which impose a general obligations to
maintain a balanced budget, to which usually certain exceptions apply and the realization of which
is to be speciﬁed through legislation. See further F Fabbrini, ‘The Fiscal Compact, the “Golden
Rule” and the Paradox of European Federalism’ (2013) 36 BCIntl&CompLRev 1.
12 HP Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (JCB Mohr 1972) 995.
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and existential characteristic of the European Community. That same year,
Pierre Pescatore concluded in a similar vein that the Treaties were ‘entièrement
pétris de téléologie’, ie entirely imbued with teleology.13 At ﬁrst glance, given
the manifold and wide-ranging objectives in the current EU Treaties, this
would seem to ring all the more true today.
However, this piece argues that in fact the opposite is the case. As the
legal order of the Union ‘thickens’14 into one with more complex features,
objectives have come to coexist with a variety of other ‘constitutional
principles’15 in the law of the EU. Consequently, the pre-eminence of, and
indeed the very ‘need for objectives’—in any existential sense—has decreased.
This entails furthermore that objectives have lost their original function—
inherited from the principle of ‘speciality’ of international organizations—to
establish powers for the Union. Today, the objectives of the Union no longer
determine the limits of the powers of the Union or call for self-perpetuating
deeper integration. Instead, they oblige the institutions to continuously pursue
these objectives in the exercise of their powers and may serve as an interpretive
lens favouring legal arguments pushing for the marginal extension of power,
the limits of which were not entirely clear and need judicial clariﬁcation.
Unsurprisingly, it is usually the EU institutions which hope to beneﬁt from
such arguments when invoking them in court.
In order to elaborate on this argument, the article ﬁrst revisits the function
of objectives in the charters of international organizations. It then turns
to the widening of EU powers and goals over time, and delves into the
changing nature of the Union legal order and the eﬀects this has on the role
assumed by the objectives enshrined in its primary law as well as on
the speciﬁc question of the EU’s ﬁnalité. A conclusion will sum up the
ﬁndings.
II. ‘SPECIALITY’ AND ‘FUNCTIONALITY’ OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
As the point of departure for discerning the position of objectives in
EU primary law, it is useful to revisit the codiﬁed tasks of international
organizations. After all, today’s EU has its historical origins in specialized
international organizations, ie the European and Steel Community (ECSC)
13 P Pescatore, ‘Les objectifs de la Communauté européenne comme principes d’interprétation
dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice’ inMiscellanea W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch: Studia
ab discipulis amicisque in honorem egregii professoris edita (Bruylant 1972) 325, 327.
14 Drawing on Joseph Raz’s terminology, J Raz, ‘On the Authority and Interpretation
of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries’ in L Alexander (ed), Constitutionalism: Philosophical
Foundations (CUP 1998) 152.
15 K-P Sommermann, ‘Herkunft und Funktionen von Verfassungsprinzipien in der
Europäischen Union’ in H Bauer and C Calliess (eds), Verfassungsprinzipien in Europa/
Constitutional Principles in Europe/Principes constitutionnels en Europe (Sakkoulas/Berliner
Wissenschaftsverlag/Bruylant 2008) 15.
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and the European Economic Community (EEC).16 According to the usual
deﬁnition, international organizations are entities based on an international
agreement and governed by international law, with States (and/or other
organizations) as their members and equipped with at least one organ with a
will of its own.17 They are conceived of as derivative subjects of international
law wielding only a limited set of powers, in contrast to States as the original
and complete subjects of international law.18 The purposes for which such
organizations are founded are crucial to establishing the limits of their powers.
In other words, they represent the border line between what is to be considered
intra and ultra vires.
Unlike States, which have the capability to establish their own competences
(in German known as Kompetenz-Kompetenz), the powers of international
organizations are restricted to those that have been attributed to them. This
accords special importance to the goals which the organization is charged to
pursue. According to Schermers and Blokker, they have ‘no unlimited power
unconnected to the pursuance of speciﬁc objectives’.19 They are quintessen-
tially functional entities as their powers only ‘stretch far enough to include all
acts indispensable for the performance of the functions of the organization’.20
In the Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice from 1927 on
the Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, this characteristic
functionality was brought to the fore:
As the European Commission is not a State, but an international institution
with a special purpose, it only has the functions bestowed upon it by the
Deﬁnitive Statute with a view to the fulﬁlment of that purpose, but it has power to
exercise these functions to their full extent, in so far as the Statute does not impose
restrictions upon it.21
16 The European Atomic Energy Community continues to be a separate legal entity. See
M Cremona, ‘The Two (or Three) Treaty Solution: The New Treaty Structure of the EU’ in
A Biondi, P Eeckhout and S Ripley (eds), EU Law After Lisbon (OUP 2012) 40. In addition, the
EU has taken over the tasks of the Western European Union, which was dissolved in 2011, see
Western European Union, Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on
behalf of the High Contracting Parties to the Modiﬁed Brussels Treaty, Brussels, 31 March 2010.
17 H Schermers and N Blokker, International Institutional Law (4th edn, Martinus Nijhoﬀ
2003) 36–47; see also P Sands and P Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (5th edn,
Sweet & Maxwell 2001) 16–17.
18 See M Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008), 261; N Quoc Dinh, P Daillier and
A Pellet, Droit International Public (7th edn, LGDJ 2002) 574; V Epping, ‘Völkerrechtssubjekte’
in K Ipsen (ed), Völkerrecht (5th edn, CH Beck 2004) 55, 57–8.
19 Schermers and Blokker (n 17) 158.
20 ibid; see also E Klein, ‘Die Internationalen und die Supranationalen Organisationen’ in
W Graf Vitzthum (ed), Völkerrecht (5th edn, De Gruyter 2010) 263, 276; and Shaw (n 18) 1306–9.
21 Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube (1927) PCIJ. Series B, no 14, 64;
see also A Campbell, ‘The Limits of the Powers of International Organisations’ (1983) 32 ICLQ
523. Though note also de Witte, who points out that the European Commission of the Danube had
‘very extensive powers’ for an international organization at that time in history, B de Witte, ‘The
European Union as an international legal experiment’ in G de Búrca and JHH Weiler (eds),
The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP 2011) 19, 23.
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Subsequently, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), re-emphasized the link
between goals and powers in its own case law. In the Reparation for Injuries
case, it stressed that ‘[w]hereas a State possesses the totality of international
rights and duties recognized by international law, the rights and duties of an
entity such as the Organization must depend upon its purposes and function’.22
This has been termed the ‘principle of speciality’, which according to the ICJ
means that international organizations ‘are invested by the States which create
them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common interests
whose promotion those States entrust to them’.23
Consequently, the objectives of the organization become the most important,
if not the only, factor for determining which actions would be ultra vires. In
the Certain Expenses Opinion of 1962, the ICJ ruled that for any act ‘which
warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulﬁlment of one of the
stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not
ultra vires the Organization.’24 Hence, for all practical purposes, it is accurate
to conclude that ‘the deﬁnition of the objectives of the organization forms
the only constitutional limit on the scope of operational activities’.25 Hence
objectives and competence norms can be seen as largely identical, forming a
single type of norm to be found in the founding charters of international
organizations.
Turning to the outset of European integration and the predecessors of what
is the post-Lisbon EU, it is possible to identify, at least superﬁcially, that
very same situation. The ECSC and the later EEC were set up by States through
international agreements. These were governed by international law and
established organs with a distinct will from the Member States in order to
pursue certain speciﬁc objectives spelt out in the founding treaties. However,
over time it became apparent that with deepening integration, the Communities
evolved in certain respects away from ordinary international organizations,
with repercussions for the nature of their legal order as well as their objectives.
As Pierre Pescatore put it, behind these seemingly technical objectives, above
all the establishment of the common market, loomed ‘a more distant ﬁnalité,
that of political union’.26
This dynamic is a central element in the traditionally inﬂuential integration
theory of (Neo-) Functionalism.27 While in the law of international
22 Reparation for Injuries Suﬀered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Rep 1949 (April 11) at 174, 180.
23 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conﬂict, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Rep 1996 (July 8) at 66, para 25.
24 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1962 (July 20) at 151,
168 (italics in the original). 25 Schermers and Blokker (n 17) 766.
26 (In the original: ‘se proﬁle une ﬁnalité plus lointaine, celle de l’unité politique’) Pescatore
(n 13) 327.
27 See seminally E Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces
1950–1957 (Stanford University Press 1968); also W Sandholtz and A Stone Sweet,
‘Neofunctionalism and Supranational Governance’ in E Jones, A Menon and S Weatherill (eds),
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organizations the term ‘functional’ denotes the limited, derivative nature of
organizations as opposed to States, which are by contrast not conﬁned to
any particular ‘function’ or ‘task’, the theory of Neofunctionalism sought
to theoretically grasp the so-called ‘Monnet method’. The original objectives
of the Communities, uncontroversial because largely economic, according
to that narrative, were seen as propelling European integration further as
the pursuit of these only seemingly speciﬁc and circumscribed functions
would ultimately necessitate deeper integration in other, more politically
charged domains. Thus, ‘spillovers’ would occur with the eﬀect of ultimately
transforming the nature of the Communities in view of these expanding
functions.
Whether one subscribes to the explanatory value of this theory or not,
in terms of legal appreciation the question arises, ﬁrst, to which extent the
objectives of the European Union can still be regarded through the lens of
strict ‘functionality’ and ‘speciality’ of international organizations given the
progressing and deepening process of integration; and second, whether in a
Union consolidated in the course of more than half a century, its objectives can
still be seen as harbouring a ‘more distant ﬁnalité’ yet to be achieved.
III. BEYOND ‘SPECIALITY’: THE EXPANDING AMBIT OF THE EU
In the course of the past decades, the scope of action of the EU and its
predecessors has expanded signiﬁcantly.28 This expansion renders the under-
standing of the EU as an organization endowed with speciﬁc functions within a
particular subject area, which is characteristic of traditional international
organizations, increasingly inappropriate.29 Instead, the Treaties have come to
exhibit a more general purpose encapsulating a ‘European common good’30
through a kaleidoscope of diﬀerent aspects of it.
This shift becomes evident when revisiting the evolution of the primary
law over time. The 1951 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community states in its ﬁrst Article that the Community is to be ‘based on a
common market, common objectives, and common institutions’.31 It identiﬁes
clearly the Member States as Masters of the Treaty, which create an
international organization for speciﬁc purposes.
Concerning the objectives in particular, the ‘task’ of the ECSC is spelt out
in Article 2 of its founding treaty, viz. ‘to contribute to economic expansion,
The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (OUP 2012) 18; and B Rosamond, Theories of
European Integration (Macmillan 2000) 31–42 on Functionalism and 50–73 on Neofunctionalism.
28 See for a historic overview also Glaesner (n 5). 29 Sommermann (n 5) 159.
30 See further on this notion C Calliess, ‘Gemeinwohl in der Europäischen Union. Über den
Staaten- und Verfassungsverbund zum Gemeinwohlverbund’ in W Brugger, S Kirste and
M Anderheiden (eds), Gemeinwohl in Deutschland, Europa und der Welt (Nomos 2002) 172.
31 Art 1 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty)
(emphases added).
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the development of employment and the improvement of the standard of
living in the participating countries through the institution, in harmony with
the general economy of the member States, of a common market’.32 This is
subsequently linked to more speciﬁc goals in Article 3 ECSC, such as ensuring
‘the orderly supply to the common market’33 or promoting ‘the growth of
international trade’.34
However, the ECSC Treaty already reveals intimations of a wider and more
ambitious project. In its preamble, one can ﬁnd next to references to fostering
peace and prosperity the intention to use the ECSC as the starting point for a
more ambitious integration trajectory.35 Echoing the Schuman Declaration,36
it underlines ‘the fact that Europe can be built only by concrete actions which
create a real solidarity and by the establishment of common bases for economic
development’.37 The preamble of the ECSC Treaty then points to a future
based on ‘a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by
bloody conﬂicts’ endowed with ‘institutions which will give direction to a
destiny henceforth shared’.38
The same observations can be made with regard to the 1957 Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, ie both as an organization
created for a speciﬁc purpose (economic integration through the common
market) and as evidence of expanding the project of integration through
opening up new ﬁelds of common action. Article 1 EC highlights that an
international treaty is the basis of the EEC, Article 2 sets out its ‘task’39 (in the
singular), and Article 3 then continues with a list of activities linked to this
task. At the same time, already the original 1957 version of the EEC Treaty
makes clear that the integration project is meant to evolve, not least by evoking
at the beginning of the preamble the idea of ‘an ever closer union among the
European peoples’.40
Over the course of various Treaty revisions, these provisions on the tasks
and activities of the Community have been extended signiﬁcantly in scope,
reﬂecting the growing ﬁelds of Community action and advancing integration.41
Whereas the main aim enshrined in Article 2 of the EEC Treaty of 1957 still
32 Art 2, ﬁrst subpara ECSC Treaty. 33 Art 3(a) ECSC Treaty.
34 Art 3(f) ECSC Treaty. 35 Fifth recital of the preamble, ECSC Treaty.
36 Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950. 37 Third recital of the preamble, ECSC
Treaty. 38 Fifth recital of the preamble, ECSC Treaty.
39 This task is related to the common market, which appears rather as a means to an end here
‘The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively
approximating the economic policies of the Member States, to promote throughout the Community
a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an
increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the
States belonging to it.’
40 First recital of the preamble, EEC Treaty (original version) (emphasis added); even clearer in
terms of continuous evolution is the French version (‘union sans cesse plus étroite’).
41 This development has also been designated as ‘competence creep’, see eg S Weatherill,
‘Competence Creep and Competence Control’ (2004) 23 YEL 1.
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focussed on the common market and economic integration, the same provision
in the version of the Nice Treaty of 2001 makes the widening and deepening
that occurred in the meantime evident by referring—beyond the economic
aspects of integration—to monetary union, sustainability, social aspects,
gender equality, solidarity and environmental protection.42 This can also be
gleaned from the longer list of activities and more numerous policies of the
Community. While Article 3 EEC of the Rome Treaty listed 11 such activities,
almost all of an economic character,43 the Article as it appears after the
Nice reform catalogues no fewer than 21 activities and policies, including
environmental, health and energy policies.44
The Maastricht Treaty added to the aims of the Community the objectives
of the European Union. In addition to what used to be called the ‘ﬁrst pillar’,
ie the Community, this concerns the former second and third pillars, ie the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Justice and Home
Aﬀairs (later Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters after the
1997 Amsterdam Treaty). Article 1 of the TEU expresses the fact that an
international treaty remains the basis of the Union. However, it includes
the idea that the ‘task’ of the Union ‘shall be to organise, in a manner
demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States
and between their peoples’.45 This task is much wider and clearly transcends
the strictly economic sphere of action.
Article 2 TEU subsequently lists the ‘objectives’ of the Union, which serve
as an illustration of the width which EU activities had assumed by that time.
These include, among others, promoting ‘economic and social progress and
a high level of employment’, ‘the establishment of economic and monetary
union’, asserting the Union’s ‘identity on the international scene’, ‘the pro-
tection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States through
the introduction of a citizenship of the Union’ and maintaining ‘an area of
freedom, security and justice’.46
In addition to these, the more speciﬁc objectives of the second and third
pillars need to be considered as well. These consisted of, in the case of the CFSP:
. to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and
integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United
Nations Charter;
. to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
42 Art 2 EC.
43 But note already art 3(i) and (k) EEC (original version), on the establishment of a European
Social Fund and cooperation with the overseas countries (also in terms of social development),
respectively.
44 Art 3 EC. For the concurrent expansion of Community powers beyond the Treaty text, taking
also into account its interpretation by the institutions, see D Wyatt, ‘Is the European Union an
Organization of Limited Powers?’ in A Arnull et al. (eds), A Constitutional Order of States? Essays
in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Hart 2011) 3.
45 Art 1(3) TEU (Nice version). 46 Art 2 TEU (Nice version).
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. to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with
the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the
Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those
on external borders;
. to promote international cooperation;
. to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms.47
The objectives of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters are
deﬁned as providing ‘citizens with a high level of safety within an area of
freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the
Member States in the ﬁelds of police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters and by preventing and combating racism and xenophobia’.48 This
entails more speciﬁcally ‘preventing and combating crime, organised or
otherwise, in particular terrorism, traﬃcking in persons and oﬀences against
children, illicit drug traﬃcking and illicit arms traﬃcking, corruption and
fraud’.49 The codiﬁcation of these objectives, ranging from combatting crime
to spreading democracy across the globe, are at any rate not evidently linked to
the common market anymore. As a result, this changes the originally
predominantly economic character of the Treaty objectives.50
However, by no means do the Treaties represent the Union as the ﬁnal step
in the integration process. The TEU post-Nice states in the preamble that
the Union constitutes ‘a new stage in the process of European integration’. It
expresses furthermore the resolve ‘to continue the process of creating an ever
closer union among the peoples of Europe’ and points to ‘further steps to be
taken in order to advance European integration’.51
The latest step in this widening of the objectives of the Union is the
Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009.52 The failure of
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe notwithstanding, the Lisbon
Treaty incorporates many if not most of the changes envisaged by the
Constitutional Treaty, including with regard to objectives. The Community has
been absorbed into the single legal personality of the Union.53 The EU now
47 Art 11 TEU (Nice version). 48 Art 29(1) TEU (Nice version).
49 Art 29(2) TEU (Nice version). Even though these are worded as means rather than actual
objectives (‘That objective shall be achieved by’), it would appear more appropriate to consider
them as speciﬁcations of the general objective. The means to these ends are contained in the
measures listed subsequently in that provision (ie closer cooperation between police forces judicial
and customs authorities as well as approximation of rules in criminal matters).
50 See Calliess (n 5) 90. 51 Thirteenth recital of the preamble TEU (Nice version).
52 Subsequent amendments to the primary law have thus far left unaﬀected the objectives of the
EU, such as the Treaty and Act concerning the accession of Croatia to the EU [2013] OJ L112/7 or
the amendments regarding the European Stability Mechanism adopted by virtue of the simpliﬁed
revision procedure of art 48(6) TEU (European Council Decision 2011/199/EU of 25 March 2011
amending art 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability
mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro [2011] OJ L91/1).
53 Art 1(3) TEU (Lisbon version).
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represents an integrated structure, having abandoned the rather confusing pillar
structure introduced by Maastricht.54
Nonetheless, it remains based on a set of treaties instead of one
constitutional document.55 This is reﬂected still in the ﬁrst Articles of both
the TEU and TFEU.56 Moreover, Article 1 TEU now stipulates that the
Union is not simply established, as the previous versions stated,57 but that
the Member States confer competences on it ‘to attain objectives they have in
common’.58 These changes seem to hark back to the principle of speciality
of international organizations and emphasize the role of the Member States
as ‘master of the treaties’.
However, for the ﬁrst time the values on which the EU is founded are placed
before its objectives.59 Yet, this relegation of the objectives of the Union after
the values was not accompanied by narrowing them down. To the contrary, the
Lisbon reform led to both further expansion and streamlining of the objectives
of the EU. The overall expression of these can now be found in Article 3 TEU.
This provision includes the overall aim of promoting ‘peace, its values and the
well-being of its peoples’,60 providing for an area of freedom, security and
justice,61 the competitive and prosperous internal market combined with
‘sustainable development of Europe’, social justice equality and solidarity as
well as diversity,62 the economic and monetary union,63 as well as the general
objectives of EU external relations, including defending the Union’s interests
internationally whilst spreading human rights, democracy and the rule of
law abroad.64
Given that ‘the new list focuses on non-economic goals to a far greater
extent than the EC Treaty’,65 a turn from predominantly economic goals to an
overarching range of objectives is undeniable. In other words, there is no
‘speciality’ to the EU anymore according to its highest laws. This general set of
goals continues to be complemented by numerous objectives related to speciﬁc
policy areas and even sub-areas. These include, for example, the particular
aims of environmental (Article 191(1) TFEU), energy (Article 194(1) TFEU)
and foreign policy (Article 21 TEU). The latter is even further subdivided into
54 J-C Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis (CUP 2010) 65–9; and P Van
Elsuwege, ‘EU external action after the collapse of the pillar structure: In search of a new balance
between delimitation and consistency’ (2010) 47 CMLRev 987. 55 Cremona (n 16).
56 Art 1(1) TEU, and in particular art 1(2) TFEU: ‘This Treaty and the Treaty on European
Union constitute the Treaties on which the Union is founded.’ See also M Pechstein, ‘Art. 1 (ex-
Art. 1 EUV) [Gründung der Europäischen Union; Grundlagen]’ in R Streinz (ed), EUV/AEUV:
Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union
(2nd edn, CH Beck 2012) 7, 11.
57 Compare art 1 EC and art 1(1) TEU (Nice version). 58 Art 1(1) TEU.
59 Art 2 TEU; and previously art 6 TEU (Nice version). See further on the importance of values
in the evolving EU legal order infra section IV. 60 Art 3(1) TEU.
61 Art 3(2) TEU. 62 Art 3(3) TEU. 63 Art 3(4) TEU. 64 Art 3(5) TEU.
65 K Lenaerts and P Van Nuﬀel, European Union Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 107;
also M Ruﬀert, ‘Art. 3 (ex-Art. 2 EUV) [Ziele der EU]’ in C Calliess and M Ruﬀert (eds), EUV/
AEUV Kommentar (4th edn, CH Beck 2011) marginal no 6; and Drescher (n 5) 67.
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diﬀerent ﬁelds of external action with their own objectives, such as trade policy
(Article 206 TFEU) or development cooperation (Article 208 TFEU).
This development of primary law language in the course of time reveals, on
the one hand, that objectives have always ﬁgured prominently in the primary
law of the Union and its predecessor organizations. On the other, while
they were rather limited and focussed on speciﬁc areas at the outset, as the
Union became ‘ever closer’, they expanded far beyond their original remit.
While it was still plausible to situate the ECSC and EEC among classic
international organizations marked by functionality, this has become increas-
ingly inappropriate over time with regard to the EU. If the Union is supposed
to be a ‘functional’ entity, those functions are now manifold, and not at all
‘specialized’ and conﬁned to one single area of activity anymore. According
to Gráinne de Búrca, while it started ‘as a kind of pilot project of limited
economic integration with a view to securing greater peace and prosperity
for the Member States, the EU has evolved into something much larger,
more complex and more ambitious’.66 This raised level of ambition alone,
however, is not the only or even most important expression of the changing
nature of the EU over time. More important is its increased complexity—its
‘transformation’ or ‘constitutionalization’. This was due a more profound
change in the legal order of the EU, which will be explored in the next
section. This transformation, in turn, aﬀects how the objectives codiﬁed in
the Treaties operate as legal norms within such a transformed, ‘thickened’ legal
order.
IV. THE CHANGING ROLE OF OBJECTIVES IN A MATURING LEGAL ORDER
With integration advancing, the objectives of the EU expanded from rather
narrowly deﬁned economic ones into a large variety of areas. Viewed in
isolation, however, this would merely amount to an international organization
with an unusually large catalogue of functions, with no bearing on their
operation as legal norms. Today, other contemporary international organiza-
tions do not shy away from enshrining wide-ranging, audacious goals into their
charters either.67 What sets the EU apart as a legal order is that the nature of
the Union itself is understood as having transformed.68 It is argued here that
this transformation—this ‘constitutionalization’—has had a profound eﬀect on
the role of objectives of the Union as norms within its legal order.
Into what exactly the Union and its legal order have changed remains a
source of controversy and debate, with opinions ranging from a merely
66 G de Búrca, ‘Europe’s raison d’être’ in D Kochenov and F Amtenbrink, The European
Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order (CUP 2014) 21, 21.
67 cf ASEAN Charter, signed 20 November 2007, art 1; Constitutive Act of the African Union,
signed 11 July 2000, art 3.
68 See the seminal contribution JHH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100
YaleLJ 2403.
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enhanced international organization to a quasi-federal entity with its own
constitution.69 Moreover, given that integration remains an ongoing process,
the end point of integration or what the Union is to become eventually remain
contentious issues which the Lisbon Treaty did not resolve, and controversy
over which is kindled by the current turmoil on economic and ﬁnancial
governance.70 This concerns the question of ﬁnalité of the Union, which, as
is argued here, is today a matter distinct from the question of the legal function
of Union objectives.
Whether the Union legal order has transformed to such an extent that
one could properly speak of a ‘constitutional’ order depends of course on the
deﬁnition and criteria applied to the notion of ‘constitution’ and ‘constitution-
alism’.71 This has raised issues of whether only States can have ‘real’
constitutions,72 and to which extent a people—a demos—is required for a
political community and the constitutional credentials of its legal order.73
Beyond such exclusionary criteria, the argument here employs the sliding scale
between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ constitutionalism. While the EU certainly is not a
State, and while it may be diﬃcult to discern a European demos, in the eyes of
many scholars its primary law has nonetheless assumed the role that a
constitution fulﬁls in the legal order of a State.74 Despite not being a State and
lacking a ‘people’, the EU legal order has undeniably come to acquire
69 For an overview of some of the more prominent labels used to describe the Union and its
legal order, see N Walker and S Tierney, ‘Introduction: A Constitutional Mosaic? Exploring the
New Frontiers of Europe’s Constitutionalism’ in N Walker, M Shaw and S Tierney (eds), Europe’s
Constitutional Mosaic (Hart 2011) 1, 7–8; and N Walker, ‘The Place of European Law’ in G de
Búrca and JHH Weiler (eds), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP 2011) 57, 78–9.
70 See E Chiti and PG Teixeira, ‘The constitutional implications of the European responses to
the ﬁnancial and public debt crisis’ (2013) 50 CMLRev 683; and K Tuori, ‘The European Financial
Crisis: Constitutional Aspects and Implications’ (2013) EUI Working Paper Law 2012/28.
71 The concept of the ‘constitutionalzation’ of Union itself is a matter of debate with many
currents. For a useful overview see M Avbelj, ‘Questioning EU Constitutionalisms’ (2008) 9
German Law Journal 1.
72 For historical examples to the contrary, see E Tanchev, ‘The Lisbon Treaty within and
without Constitutional Orthodoxy’ in I Pernice and E Tanchev (eds), Ceci n’est pas une
Constitution –Constitutionalisation without a Constitution? (Nomos 2009) 22; and L Besselink,
‘The Notion and Nature of the European Constitution After the Lisbon Treaty’ in J Wouters,
L Verhey and P Kiiver (eds), European Constitutionalism beyond Lisbon (Intersentia 2009) 261,
262, who ranks the constitutional law of the EU among what he terms ‘the non-revolutionary,
historical types of constitutions’.
73 See on the ‘no demos’ thesis, JHHWeiler, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos
and the German Maastricht Decision’ (1995) 1 ELJ 219; for further references to the
constitutionalization literature see R Streinz, ‘European Integration through constitutional law’ in
H-J Blanke and S Mangiameli (eds),Governing Europe under a Constitution: The Hard Road from
the European Treaties to a European Constitutional Treaty (Springer 2006) 1, 9 (fn 65).
74 See eg Müller-Graﬀ (n 5) marginal no 78; R Schütze, European Constitutional Law (CUP
2012) 3–5; R Streinz, C Ohler and C Herrmann, Der Vertrag von Lissabon zur Reform der EU:
Einführung mit Synopse (3rd edn, CH Beck 2010) 16; D Grimm, ‘Ursprung und Wandel der
Verfassung’ in J Isensee and P Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland (3rd edn, C.F. Müller 2003) vol 1 (Historische Grundlagen) 3, 41; and M Claes and
M de Visser, ‘Reﬂections on comparative method in European constitutional law’ in M Adams and
J Bomhoﬀ (eds), Practice and Theory in Comparative Law (CUP 2012) 143, 149, who note that the
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numerous features evidencing a rather ‘thick’ form of constitutionalism,75
which will be elaborated upon below. From this point of view, the term
‘constitutional’ can be applied to EU primary law. Since this assessment is
based on observable features, the fact that the European Council claimed
to have abandoned the ‘constitutional concept’76 following the failure of the
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe to enter into force cannot in itself
abrogate this ‘constitutional’ nature thus deﬁned.
The Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ) usually appears as the main protagonist
in eﬀecting and elaborating upon the evolution of the Union legal order.77
It famously declared the Treaties and the legal order they established as
representing ‘a new legal order of international law’.78 In the following, the
narrative of transformation will be revisited with a particular regard as to what
this entails for the objectives enshrined in the Treaties.
Whence and towards where the EU legal order has evolved can be
expressed in the form of two archetypical opposing positions: on the one hand,
the classic international organization as a derivative subject of international
law, created to perform certain functions, which exists by virtue of this very
functionality and, as outlined above, whose powers are delimited by these
functions; on the other, a matured, constitutionalized legal order endowed with
‘constitutional objectives’. To recall the classic distinction: States, given their
all-encompassing Kompetenz-Kompetenz, do not need objectives—they do not
have an existential Zielbedarf. From comparative constitutional law, we learn
that constitutional objectives as such do not establish any competences.
These are regulated elsewhere in the constitution by other norms.79 This
all-encompassing power to allocate one’s own competences and lack of
Zielbedarf notwithstanding, there is a clear trend in constitutional design for
States to include objectives in their highest laws.80 However, as legal norms
within a domestic legal order, they retain a rather low degree of force81 and are
only expected to be pursued within the bounds of what is materially possible.82
Rather than hard-and-fast obligations, they operate as more ﬂuid principles,
composite of Member State and EU constitutional norms performs ‘the function which in a national
legal system is fulﬁlled by constitutional law’.
75 P Craig, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union’ (2001) 7 ELJ 125,
126–35.
76 European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council 21 and
22 June 2007, 20 July 2007, 11177/1/07 REV 1, Annex I: IGC mandate, 15 (pt 1). Discounting this
‘proclamation’ for the debate on the constitutional approach are eg S Griller, ‘The Reform’s
Typology: Treaty or Constitution?’ in I Pernice and E Tanchev (eds), Ceci n’est pas une
Constitution: Constitutionalisation without a Constitution? (Nomos 2008) 44, 52–5; and A von
Bogdandy and J Bast, ‘The Constitutional Approach to EU Law’ in A von Bogdandy and J Bast
(eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Hart/CH Beck 2011) 1, 1–3.
77 See here seminally E Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational
Constitution’ (1981) 75 AJIL 1; and more critically H Rasmussen, European Court of Justice
(GadJura 1998).
78 Case 26/62 van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR English special edition 1, para 10.
79 Sommermann (n 7) 366. 80 ibid 198–252; De Montalivet (n 7) 53–63.
81 De Montalivet (n 7) 563. 82 Sommermann (n 7) 224.
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which serve to reconcile between, for instance, diﬀerent individual rights,83
or as ‘optimization requirements’, as deﬁned by Robert Alexy, for various
aspects of State activity.84 Due to their rather weak legal force, they serve
primarily as a means for interpreting other constitutional norms and secondary
law.85
With these two opposing positions in mind, it is essential, then, to enquire
what the transformation of the EU to something ‘more than an international
organization (as reﬂected by the judicially recognized doctrines of supremacy,
direct eﬀect etc.) but less than a federal state (no welfare state, insuﬃcient
resources, no army etc.)’86 entails for the role of its objectives as legal norms
within the primary law.
For the former European Communities, objectives could be considered
of existential importance for the ﬁrst decades of their history. This reﬂects
their original conception as international organizations and was the reason
why Hans Peter Ipsen coined the term Zielbedarf as a deﬁning trait of these
organizations.87 The existential nature of the objectives also becomes apparent
in the judgment of the ECJ of 1987 in Gímenez Zaera. The Court, noting that
‘Article 2 of the Treaty describes the task of the European Economic
Community’, ruled that ‘the aims laid down in that provision are concerned
with the existence and functioning of the Community’.88
Prior to this judgment, the ECJ considered that former Article 2 EC ‘is
placed at the head of the general principles which govern [the Treaty]’.89
Generally, the objectives have played a signiﬁcant role in the legal process of
integration, above all in view of the distinctly teleological interpretation
employed by the Court aimed at ensuring the greatest practical eﬀectiveness of
EU law (its eﬀet utile).90 This emphasis on objectives by the Court, however,
was then used as the interpretive point of departure for distinguishing the EEC
83 B Faure, ‘Les objectifs de valeur constitutionnelle: une nouvelle catégorie juridique?’ (1995)
No 21 Revue française de droit constitutionnel 47.
84 Sommerman (n 7) 360–1; see on the concept R Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights
(OUP 2002) 47.
85 Reddy (n 7) 73; TK Tope, Constitutional Law of India (2nd edn, Eastern Book Company
1992) 353; and DK Singh, V.N. Shukla’s Constitution of India, sixth edition (6th edn, Eastern Book
Company 1975) 180; Sommermann (n 7) 5; P Badura, ‘Arten der Verfassungsrechtssätze’ in
J Isensee and P Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (3rd
edn, CF Müller 2003), vol VII 33, 42; De Montalivet (n 7) 454; H Roussillon, Le Conseil
constitutionnel (5th edn, Dalloz 2004) 82–3.
86 C Barnard, ‘Introduction: The Constitutional Treaty, the Constitutional Debate and the
Constitutional Process’ in C Barnard (ed), The Fundamentals of EU Law Revisited: Assessing the
Impact of the Constitutional Debate (OUP 2007) 1, 3.
87 Ipsen (n 12) 995. 88 Case 126/86 Giménez Zaera v Institut Nacional de la Seguridad
Social and Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social [1987] ECR 3697, para 10 (emphasis added).
89 Case 167/73 Commission v France [1974] ECR 359, para 18. The German version of the
judgment uses even stronger language. It speaks of ‘vertragsprägende allgemeine Grundsätze’,
ie ‘general principles which characterize the Treaty’.
90 Calliess (n 5) 85; and Pescatore (n 13) 327; see also M Pollack, The Engines of European
Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU (OUP 2003) 189.
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Treaty from traditional international agreements and the Community from
ordinary international organizations. As a result, paradoxical as it may seem,
this would eventually result in decreasing the need of the Union legal order
to rely on objectives as an existential feature and deprive them of their
competence founding nature.
Already in the van Gend & Loos judgment, the Court highlighted the
‘objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market’ but
noted at the same time that its functioning ‘is of direct concern to interested
parties in the Community’.91 This objective, coupled with the observation that
sovereign rights had been transferred to the Community institutions, led the
ECJ to conclude that the EEC Treaty was in fact ‘more than an agreement
which merely creates mutual obligations between the Contracting States’.92
Tracing the diﬀerent milestones in the case law of the Court that underpin the
transformation thesis, other norms and features come to the fore which in turn
qualify the importance of Treaty objectives. In its landmark judgement in
Les Verts of 1986, the ECJ famously found that ‘the European Economic
Community is a Community based on the rule of law’ and equipped with a
‘basic constitutional charter, the Treaty’.93 In Opinion 1/91, the Court did not
only reiterate the constitutional claim, but now expressly distinguished the
Community from international organizations: ‘In contrast, the EEC Treaty,
albeit concluded in the form of an international agreement, none the less
constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of
law.’94 It furthermore highlighted primacy and direct eﬀect as ‘essential
characteristics of the Community legal order’.95 Objectives, on their part, not
long before deemed existential, were not mentioned as essential characteristics.
Of particular signiﬁcance regarding this ‘thickening’ of the legal order is the
much-discussed judicial ‘discovery’ of fundamental rights as general
principles of Community law by the Court.96 This was subsequently (partially)
codiﬁed in Article 6 TEU (Nice version), which stated the values on which the
Union was founded.97 This development took place against the backdrop of
challenges from highest national courts, which challenged the ECJ by claiming
the power to review the validity of Community acts against the standard
of fundamental rights protection enshrined in their respective national
91 van Gend & Loos (n 78) para 9.
92 ibid. Hallstein, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft (5th edn, Econ Verlag 1979) 53, described
the Treaties as ‘acts of creation’ (‘Schöpfungsakte’) and not just ‘a batch of rights and duties of the
contracting parties’ (‘einem Bündel von Rechten und Pﬂichten der vertragschließenden Staaten’).
93 Case 294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ [1986] ECR 1339, para 23.
94 Opinion 1/91 (EEA) [1991] ECR I-6079, para 21 (emphases added).
95 ibid. See also A Rosas and L Armati, EU Constitutional Law: An Introduction (Hart 2010) 3.
96 Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419; generally and for further case law see eg Schütze
(n 74) 409–19.
97 Art 6(1) TEU (Nice version). Post-Lisbon, art 6(1) TEU refers to the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, which is of the same legal rank as the Treaties, representing the detailed codiﬁcation of the
fundamental rights within EU primary law.
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constitutions.98 The inclusion of fundamental rights as general principles of
Community law is generally seen as a response to these challenges, which was
then answered by an overall acceptance of the primacy of Community law
by the constitutional courts of the Member States.99 After all, it was the
‘constitutional traditions common to the Member States’100 from which
the ECJ drew inspiration for its fundamental rights jurisprudence. This
development, arguably more than anything else, heralds the departure from
a functional association governed by public international law towards what
in German is known as an objektive Wertordnung, ie ‘an objective order of
values’.101
In this vein, beyond fundamental rights as such, the EU Treaties now
explicitly include a statement of the values on which the ‘Union is founded’
and which ‘are common to the Member States’.102 For Stelio Mangiameli, it is
this provision from the TEU which ‘ﬁnally leads the EU out of the group of
international organizations having an economic nature and, thanks to its basic
values, the constitutional nature of the Union’s identity was strengthened in
spite of the fact that the intention of the Council was to exclude any reference
to the very notion of Constitution in the new Treaty’.103 It was introduced with
the Treaty of Amsterdam, which, however, still referred to ‘principles’ rather
than values.104 As observed earlier, after Lisbon, the values of the Union are
also now placed before the objectives of the Union. The order of provisions, of
course, has no bearing as such on their legal weight. Nonetheless, it symbolizes
a paradigm shift from a legal entity that, in the ﬁrst place, exists to strive for
certain goals to one which, above all, expounds what it stands for.
This distinction becomes clearer when considering the references to values
in terms of accession to the EU and suspending the rights of a Member State,
respectively. Concerning the former, a European State can only join the EU if
it ‘respects the values referred to in Article 2 [TEU] and is committed to
promoting them’.105 This means the State must already, at the moment of
98 Note in this context the controlimiti doctrine of the Italian Constitutional Court, in particular,
Corte costituzionale, Decision of 18 December 1973, Sentenza N. 183/1973 (Frontini); and the
German Solange I decision, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of 29 May 1974, BVerfGE 37,
271 (Solange I).
99 See eg Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of 22 October 1986, BVerfGE 73, 339 (Solange
II); and Corte costituzionale, Decision of 5 June 1984, Sentenza N. 170/1984 (Granital). Further
J Kühling, ‘Fundamental Rights’ in A von Bogdandy and J Bast (eds), Principles of European
Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Hart/CH Beck 2011) 479.
100 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, para 4. This was later
supplemented by international sources, in particular the ECHR, see Case 4/73 Nold v Commission
[1975] ECR 491, para 13.
101 The term was introduced in Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of 15 January 1958,
BVerfGE 7, 198, 205 (Lüth), para 27. 102 Art 2 TEU.
103 S Mangiameli, ‘Article 2 [The Homogeneity Clause]’ in HJ Blanke and S Mangiameli (eds),
The Treaty on European Union (TEU): A Commentary (Springer 2013) 114 (original emphases
omitted).
104 Treaty of Amsterdam art 1(8); subsequently art 6 TEU (Nice version). On the detailed
genesis of this provision see Mangiameli (n 103) 110–15. 105 Art 49(1) TEU.
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accession, be in compliance with these values. Being committed to respecting
them in the future is not enough, which would be the language used with
regard to objectives. As to the latter, in cases where the European Council has
determined ‘a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values
referred to in Article 2 [TEU]’,106 the Council may suspend certain rights of the
Member State in question, including voting rights in the Council.107 Hence, in
order to belong to the Union, and in order to retain one’s voice within it,
Member States need to respect the values of the Union. The same cannot be
said for the pursuit of Union objectives, which, in this vein, may explain why
they now take a back seat in the Treaties behind the Union’s values.
Through this process of ‘thickening’ of the EU legal order, in other
words through its ‘constitutionalization’, the role of objectives within the
EU legal order changed profoundly. As the ECJ asserted in Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft, the protection of fundamental rights would henceforth
have to ‘be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of
the Community’.108 Thus, with the increasing ‘thickening’ of the legal order,
objectives had to be contextualized with other emerging norms and normative
elements.
In addition to features such as direct eﬀect and primacy, this turn
from functionality to overarching goals, and the emergence of normative
foundations, in particular fundamental rights, was for many scholars a sign of
the constitutionalization of the Union.109 For Armin von Bogdandy, then, the
rise of such founding principles goes hand in hand with a declining importance
of objectives. He argues that only initially were the objectives enshrined in the
Treaties ‘at the centre of eﬀorts to develop an “overarching conception”’.110
Subsequently, he concludes that due to the ‘multiplication of these objectives
this approach, however, lost its persuasiveness’.111 More strongly, Franz
Reimer contends that the concept of Zielbedarf proﬀered by Ipsen, which
served both as the ‘vanishing point and source of legitimacy for all Community
action while at the same time a sign for the lacking Kompetenz-Kompetenz of
the Communities’, has disappeared altogether.112 He argues that as a unitary
legal person aiming to be understood as a ‘community of destiny and values’,
106 Art 7(2) TEU. 107 Art 7(3) TEU.
108 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n 100) para 4 (emphasis added).
109 In this context J d’Aspremont and F Dopagne, ‘Two Constitutionalisms in Europe: Pursuing
an Articulation of the European and International Legal Orders’ (2008) 68 ZaöRV 939, 943–50,
distinguish between ‘substantive’ constitutionalism, ie value-based, and ‘systemic’
constitutionalism, eg direct eﬀect and primacy.
110 A von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles of EU Law: A Theoretical and Doctrinal Sketch’
(2009) 16 ELJ 95, 99.
111 ibid. He sees the replacement of the former ‘speciﬁc objectives’ of Articles 2 and 3 EC by
current art 3 TEU as evidence for this.
112 (In the original: ‘Fluchtpunkt und Legitimationstitel allen Gemeinschaftshandelns, zugleich
Ausdruck fehlender Kompetenz-Kompetenz der Gemeinschaften’) Reimer (n 5) 992. He writes
with regard to the (then) looming Constitutional Treaty. His ﬁndings can, overall, be transferred to
the primary law as amended by the Lisbon Treaty.
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the EU is deﬁned rather by catalogues of values and fundamental rights than by
provisions on objectives.113 Moreover, in view of the competence catalogues
now contained in the Treaties, he argues that objectives have lost their
‘competence-enabling function’ (zuständigkeitseröﬀnende Funktion), which he
considers a paradigm shift.114
This shift in role and importance of objectives in the course of progressing
‘constitutionalization’ should not be confused with the obsolescence of
Union objectives or as them not being constitutional norms. It is not mutually
exclusive to assert the ‘thick’ or ‘constitutional’ quality of the EU legal order
while at the same time acknowledging the remaining, albeit diminished,
signiﬁcance of objectives within it. The ‘duty to observe’115 Union objectives
today represents a constitutional obligation. They still are ‘binding and must be
read together if they are to be properly applied’.116 They remain a cardinal
interpretive device. As the ECJ ruled repeatedly, EU law is to ‘be interpreted
and applied in the light of’ the Treaty objectives.117 This is still valid, as
evidenced by the recent case law of the ECJ which draws on Union objectives
in a variety of contexts, including disputes regarding the correct legal basis
and justiﬁcations for restrictions of fundamental freedoms.118
However, while the EU still lacks a Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the crucial
diﬀerence, compared to the outset of the integration process, is that primary
law objectives do not serve anymore as an independent source of, and
boundaries to, the powers of the Union. Acting beyond the boundaries of the
powers conferred upon the Union, ie acting ultra vires, is not the same thing as
acting outside of its goals. This applies to both general and speciﬁc objectives.
The Treaties require the Union and its institutions to take them into account
in the various policy ﬁelds119 but allows for wide discretion as to the measures
113 (In the original: ‘Schicksals- und Wertegemeinschaft’) ibid.
114 ibid 993, also 1009, referring to the failed Constitutional Treaty.
115 Case 8/57 Groupement des hauts fourneaux et aciéries belges v High Authority [1958] ECR
English special edition 245, para 8.
116 ibid; see also Case 6/72 Continental Can [1973] ECR 215, para 23. Arguing for the binding
nature of the objectives also Pechstein (n 5) 19 (marginal no 3); Reimer (n 5) 997; and Calliess
(n 5) 90.
117 Joined Cases 6 and 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Commercial
Solvents Corporation v Commission [1974] ECR 223, para 32. See also eg Case 53/81 Levin
[1982] ECR 1035, para 15; and Case 15/81 Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v Inspecteur der
Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1982] ECR 1409, para 33. In this vein also A Dashwood et al., Wyatt
& Dashwood’s European Union Law (6th edn, Hart 2011) 24.
118 eg Case C-130/10 Parliament v Council [2012] OJ C295/2, paras 61–65 (concerning the
proper legal basis for certain counterterrorism measures, in which the objectives of the AFSJ and
the CFSP were invoked by the parties); Case C-202/11 Anton Las v PSA Antwerp NV [2013] OJ
C164/3, paras 26–27 (concerning the free movement of workers and the objective of preserving the
linguistic diversity in the EU according to art 3(3) TEU); and Joint Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11
Spain and Italy v Council [2013] OJ C164/3, para 48 (stressing that enhanced cooperation is to
further the ‘objectives of the Union’ according to art 20(2) TEU); and Case C-137/12, Commission
v Council (ECJ, 22 October 2013) para 56 (concerning scope of the Common Commercial Policy).
119 See eg Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council [1996] ECR I-06177, para 23; and Case C-166/07
Council v Parliament (International Fund for Ireland) [2009] ECR I-07135, para 45.
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to be taken,120 especially where diﬀerent objectives may be clashing.121
Instead, they become goals which shape and guide the exercise of powers
deﬁned elsewhere and embedded in a more sophisticated, ‘thickened’ legal
order, much in the same way as constitutional objectives found in national
legal orders.
This is reﬂected in the evolution of Treaty language over time, which
captures the move away from the functional international organization and
towards national constitutional orders with regard to the role of objectives as
legal norms. Until the Lisbon Treaty reform, there was no uniﬁed competence
catalogue in the Treaties as there is now in Articles 2 to 6 TFEU.122 Even the
‘implied powers’ doctrine, according to which the EU acquires external powers
where common rules have been adopted or where these are necessary to
complement existing internal powers,123 has been included in the post-Lisbon
Treaties.124
By contrast, the 1957 EEC Treaty contained ‘aims’ (Article 2) and
‘activities’ (Article 3) but did not explicitly refer to conferral of competences.
In the later TEC, as amended by the Maastricht Treaty, the principle of
conferral was codiﬁed by stipulating that ‘[t]he Community shall act within the
limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives
assigned to it therein’.125 According to this formulation, the competences of
the Community were circumscribed by both conferred powers and objectives.
In the post-Lisbon version of the Treaties, however, it is stated that ‘the
Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by
the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein.’126
Thus, objectives are no longer, in their own right, a source for establishing
the powers of the Union.127 Today, objectives and powers of the Union are
120 See eg Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council [1996] ECR I-06177, para 37.
121 Case 112/80 Dürbeck [1981] ECR 01095, para 44.
122 The clariﬁcation of competences, until then provided by rather scattered Treaty provisions
and through ECJ case law, had been a major issue on the agenda ever since the Nice Treaty. To
which extent this cataloguing in the TFEU was a success is, however, debateable. See Piris (n 54)
74–8; T Tridimas, ‘Competence after Lisbon: The Elusive Search for Bright Lines’ in D Ashiagbor,
N Countouris and I Lianos (eds), The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon (CUP 2012) 47;
and rather sceptically R Schütze, ‘Lisbon and the Federal Order of Competences: A Prospective
Analysis’ (2008) 33 ELRev 709.
123 Starting with Case 22/70 Commission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263; clariﬁed in
Opinion 1/03 (Lugano Convention) [2006] ECR I-1145; see further M Cremona, ‘External
Relations and External Competence of the European Union’ in P Craig and G de Búrca, The
Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 217–68.
124 Art 3(2) TFEU; art 216(1) TFEU.
125 Art 3b(1) EC (1992 consolidated version) (emphasis added). Note also art 3b(3) EC (1992
consolidated version): ‘Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty.’ These formulations remained also after the Amsterdam and
Nice revisions. The ECJ endorsed this formulation in Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759, para 23.
126 Art 5(2) TEU (emphases added).
127 This conclusion challenges the position maintained by some authors that acts beyond
the objectives of the Union would have to be considered ultra vires, rather than looking at
competence norms. See Müller-Graﬀ (n 5) marginal no 179; similarly Reimer (n 5) 992–3; but cf
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set apart. Union competences, now catalogued elsewhere, are to be exercised
with a view of pursuing the objectives. This is conﬁrmed by other provisions
in the Treaties. According to Article 3(6) TEU, ‘[t]he Union shall pursue
its objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the competences
which are conferred upon it in the Treaties.’128 According to Loïc Azoulai,
‘[t]his clearly indicates a change of perspective’,129 given that now ‘objectives
are made subject to the competences listed in the Treaties’.130 In this same
vein, Article 13(2) TEU distinguishes between boundaries imposed by
powers and a conformity requirement with regard to objectives: ‘Each
institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the
Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set
out in them.’
Objectives and competences now appear as two related yet distinct
constitutional norm categories, next to other archetypical ones such as
individual rights, procedural norms or constitutional commands.131 While
keeping in mind that EU competences are still conferred and not inherently all-
encompassing, this mirrors the position of objectives in the national
constitutional order rather than that of a functional international organization.
A conduit between objectives and competences exists in the form of the
‘ﬂexibility clause’ now found in Article 352 TFEU (ex 308 EC). In case EU
action becomes necessary ‘within the framework of the policies deﬁned in the
Treaties to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties
have not provided the necessary powers’, such powers can be created following
a special procedure, which requires unanimity in the Council and the consent
of the European Parliament.132 This provision has been used generously in
the past, which was sanctioned by and large by the ECJ.133 As Joseph Weiler
already noted in the pre-Lisbon context, this interpretation ‘meant that it would
become virtually impossible to ﬁnd an activity which could not be brought
within the objectives of the Treaty’.134
P Craig, ‘The ECJ and ultra vires action: A conceptual analysis’ (2011) 48 CMLRev 395, who
deﬁnes EU action ultra vires in terms of competences alone rather than drawing on objectives.
128 Art 3(6) TEU (emphasis added).
129 L Azoulai, ‘Introduction: The question of competence’ in L Azoulai (ed), The Question of
Competence in the European Union (OUP 2014) 1, 11. 130 ibid 12.
131 For the latter, note, for instance, art 6(2) TEU on the accession of the EU to the ECHR.
On the typology of norm categories in constitutional law see Badura (n 85) 46 and Sommermann
(n 7) 362–73.
132 Art 352(1) TEU. Note also Declarations No 41 and 42 on art 352 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, attached to the Lisbon Treaty.
133 See eg Case 8/73 Massey-Ferguson [1973] ECR 897, para 4; Case 242/87 Commission
v Council (Erasmus) [1989] ECR 1425; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al
Barakaat [2008] ECR I-6351, para 235. See further S Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the
European Union (Longman 2002) 155–63; Lenaerts and Van Nuﬀel (n 65) 122–4.
134 Weiler (n 68) 2446; for post-Lisbon, see Rosas and Armati (n 95) 21, who similarly state that
‘the breadth of these objectives make [sic] it diﬃcult to imagine areas where the Union clearly has
no authority to go.’
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It would be misguided, however, to consider this as evidence that the
Union’s objectives, in their own right, today still serve as the outer limits of its
powers. It is not the objectives that create competences here by virtue of their
own legal force, but the special procedure established in the Treaties by virtue
of the ﬂexibility clause. While used generously in the past, at a time when
there were no comprehensive competence catalogues, both the case law of the
Court of Justice and the Lisbon reform have endeavoured to circumscribe its
use. In Opinion 2/94, the ECJ stressed that this clause ‘is designed to ﬁll the
gap where no speciﬁc provisions of the Treaty confer on the Community
institutions express or implied powers to act, if such powers appear none the
less to be necessary to enable the Community to carry out its functions with
a view to attaining one of the objectives laid down by the Treaty’.135 It cannot,
at any rate, serve to eﬀect a disguised amendment of the Treaties or upset any
of its features deemed ‘of constitutional signiﬁcance’.136
Moreover, by virtue of the Lisbon Treaty, the ﬂexibility clause ‘was
substantially amended precisely with a view to minimizing the risk of its abuse
in contravention of the spirit of the principle of conferral’.137 The Treaties now
stress that the Commission ‘shall draw national Parliaments’ attention to
proposals based on this Article’, making use of the new monitoring
mechanisms for the subsidiarity principle of Article 5(3) TEU (the so-called
‘yellow card’ procedure).138 In addition, it is now speciﬁed that the clause
‘cannot serve as a basis for attaining objectives pertaining to the common
foreign and security policy’.139 Moreover, according to Declaration No 41
attached to the Lisbon Treaty on Article 352 TFEU, ‘[t]he Conference declares
that the reference in Article 352(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union to objectives of the Union refers to the objectives as set out
in Article 3(2) and (3) of the Treaty on European Union and to the objectives
of Article 3(5)’ with respect to non-CFSP areas of external action. It
continues by stating that ‘[i]t is therefore excluded that an action based on
Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union would
only pursue objectives set out in Article 3(1) of the Treaty on European
Union’, ie the most general of EU objectives (‘promote peace, its values and
the well-being of its peoples’).
Thus, it emerges that it is the ﬂexibility clause which is the basis for
establishing additional powers of the Union, to the extent that this is not of
‘constitutional signiﬁcance’. In order to counter the risk of ‘competence creep’,
a number of limits as to the use of this mechanism apply, including subsidiarity
135 Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759, para 29.
136 ibid para 35. See also Declaration No 42 on Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, which reiterates this idea.
137 Dashwood et al. (n 117) 110.
138 Art 352(2) TFEU. Art 352(3) states in addition that the clause cannot be used to the eﬀect of
harmonizing Member State laws or regulations ‘in cases where the Treaties exclude such
harmonisation’. 139 Art 352(4) TFEU.
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control, judicial control of disguised treaty amendments and the exclusion
of more general objectives and CFSP objectives. If objectives in their own right
could serve as a legal basis for the extension of Union powers in the current
setting, there would be no need for all these safeguards here. In fact, there
would be no need for a ‘ﬂexibility clause’ in the ﬁrst place. This is conﬁrmed,
a contrario, by the absence of similar clauses in the charters of international
organizations. As far as they are concerned, by contrast, the truth continues to
hold that ‘the deﬁnition of the objectives of the organization forms the only
constitutional limit on the scope of operational activities’.140
In sum, the nature of the Union remains in a state of limbo between classic
international organization and sovereign State. However, with speciﬁc regard
to its objective and their role as legal norms, the EU has ventured far from
what can be termed a purely functional entity.141 Recalling the example used at
the outset, the EU today has evolved into something quite diﬀerent from the
European Commission of the Danube, with regard to which the Permanent
Court of International Justice emphasized that it was ‘an international
institution with a special purpose’ and with ‘functions bestowed upon it by
the Deﬁnitive Statute with a view to the fulﬁlment of that purpose’.142 With
regard to the EU today, there is not one ‘special purpose’ or even a discrete set
of objectives pertaining to a particular policy area that may still have been
discernible in the earlier Community Treaties.143 Instead, the overall purpose
of the Union, as the post-Lisbon TEU formulates it with the broadest of
brushes, is ‘to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples’.144
This purpose may be interpreted as the fostering of a European ‘common
good’, which is then crystallized further through a range of more speciﬁc
objectives. More importantly though, the EU legal order has ‘thickened’, ie it
has acquired sophisticated features such as primacy, direct eﬀect, and
normative foundations, which make it more akin to a ‘constitutional’ than a
‘functional’ entity.
This has two main consequences for Union objectives as legal norms. On the
one hand, the EU’s existence is no longer deﬁned entirely by the need to serve
140 Schermers and Blokker (n 17) 766.
141 See Rosas and Armati (n 95) 12–17 on the State-like and non-State like features of the
Union. On the former, they conclude that these features ‘are not normally associated with
intergovernmental organisations, or, if they are, they are to be seen as exceptions or even
anomalies’ (14). Similarly, Douglas-Scott (n 133) 260, who concludes that ‘even if the EEC did
conform to the status of international organisation in its early days (which is unlikely) it has now
moved well beyond that.’
142 Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube (n 21) 64.
143 See also, commenting on the general objectives of the failed Constitutional Treaty,
L Azoulai, ‘Article I-3’ in L Burgorgue-Larsen, A Levade and F Picod (eds), Traité établissant une
Constitution pour l’Europe (Bruylant 2007) vol 1, 60, 62: ‘On ne saurait, reconnaissons-le, être
plus généreux et moins sélectif dans la promesse de bienfaits sublunaires.’ Similarly, Piris (n 54)
73, states that the objectives of art 3 TEU, ‘when compared with the past Treaties, go in the
direction of respecting human values and caring for the well-being of the people’.
144 Art 3(1) TEU.
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certain functions. It does not only strive for particular future deliverables,
it also stands for certain values. In other words, its Zielbedarf has decreased.
On the other, with a view to promoting these manifold facets of the ‘common
good’, the EU cannot automatically claim any powers, or take whatever
measure it pleases. Objectives and competences have grown into two distinct
norm categories of EU primary law. While the former can inform and
serve the interpretation of the latter, objectives neither create nor
delimit competences any longer. Through the ‘thickening’ of the Union legal
order, such pursuits must be made with the powers conferred elsewhere in
the Treaties, and must be compatible with the overall structure of EU law and
in consistence with the normative foundations of the constitutional law
of the EU.
V. THE END(S) OF EUROPE: ZIELBEDARF AND FINALITÉ
As outlined above, the EU legal order has matured into what can be termed a
‘constitutionalized’ entity. This has consequences for the legal properties of the
Union’s objectives as legal norms. As was argued, Union objectives and
competences have evolved into two distinct norm categories. This section
argues that in addition, a distinction must be made between the pursuit of
Union objectives as a constitutional duty and the pursuit of particular future
form of the Union.
The EU is unlikely to have reached its end point yet, but continues to
evolve. In other words, the question of its ﬁnalité is still an open one. To recall
Pescatore’s observation from 1972, it was behind the objectives of the then
Community that ‘a more distant ﬁnalité, that of political union’ loomed.145
This then raises the question whether the pursuit of the Union’s objectives is
also propelling it, as a legal construct, into a certain direction. Finalité has been
a prominent topic in EU scholarship, especially when linked to the
constitutionalization debate in the EU.146 While to some the question of
ﬁnalité and the pursuit of Union objectives may appear as one and the same,
upon closer inspection they must be recognized as distinct.
Using a formulation with clear Kelsian undertones, Matthias Ruﬀert calls
Article 3 TEU the ‘basic norm of the programme of integration’.147 He
contends that even though EU objectives are very closely related to
145 Pescatore (n 13) 327.
146 See eg C Joerges, Y Meny, JHH Weiler (eds), What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of
Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer (European University Institute 2000), which also reproduces
Joschka Fischer’s speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin on 12 May 2000 entitled ‘From
Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration’ (19–30); N Walker,
‘After Finalité? The Future of the European Constitutional Idea’ in G Amato, H Bribosia and B de
Witte (eds), Genèse et destinée de la Constitution européenne (Bruylant 2007) 1245; also Walker
(n 69) 100; and A Follesdal, ‘Towards a stable ﬁnalité with federal features? The balancing acts of
the Constitutional Treaty for Europe’ (2005) 12 JEPP 572.
147 (In the original: ‘Grundnorm des Integrationsprogramms’) Ruﬀert (n 65) marginal no 1.
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national constitutional objectives, within the Union legal order they have
a more important role to play, as they point the integration process into
a particular direction.148 Similarly, Christian Calliess observes that objectives,
representing this basic norm of the integration programme, impose a
‘standstill’ obligation which prohibits the progress achieved in the pursuit of
the objectives from being undone.149 He furthermore points to the teleological
interpretation of the ECJ as using objectives to advance integration.150 For
him, integration thus represents a one-way process, in which the pursuit of
Union objectives requires, if anything, more integration.
However, such views intermingle the pursuit of Union objectives as a
standing constitutional obligation with the changing structure and nature of
the EU, as well as with the vertical allocation of powers between Union
and Member States. This disregards the objectives of the Union as being part of
the constitutional law of the Union as it stands. These norms neither exhaust
themselves in creating momentum for deepening integration nor do they
necessarily require it. Whether the existential ‘need for objectives’ character-
istic of international organizations will become altogether obsolete depends on
reaching a terminus of integration. It would not, however, abrogate the
constitutional duty to pursue Union objectives through whichever kind of
‘ﬁnal’ format the EU would assume.
If this end point were to be a (federal) State, then the existential need for
objectives would vanish entirely. In this sense, ﬁnalité signals the end of
Zielbedarf. In terms of its nature, the Union would have crossed the line
demarcating statehood. However, even in that case, it would remain bound
to pursue its constitutional objectives in much the same way. The important
diﬀerence here is that the Union would be equipped with a Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, ie in theory it would become the site of allocating competences
freely so as to optimize the eﬀective pursuit of its objectives. Nevertheless, as
in any federal State (assuming the EU would not become a centralized State),
competences would remain divided between the federal level and the subunits,
and constitutional rules would continue to exist which govern the division of
competences.151
148 ibid, marginal no 2.
149 Calliess (n 5) 91; referring to Joined Cases 80 and 81/77 Société Les Commissionnaires
Réunis SARL v Receveur des douanes [1978] ECR 927, para 36: ‘Any prejudice to what the
Community has achieved in relation to the unity of the market moreover risks opening the way to
mechanisms which would lead to disintegration contrary to the objectives of progressive
approximation of the economic policies of the Member States set out in Article 2 [TEC]’.
150 Calliess (n 5) 85.
151 Rosas and Armati (n 95) 16 stress that the principle of conferral ‘is not unknown in the
constitutions of certain federal states and it is therefore open to debate whether the principle of
conferral amounts to a state or a non-state feature’. See further on the federalist paradigm in EU
law, R Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law
(OUP 2009); and E Cloots, G De Baere and S Sottiaux (eds), Federalism in the European Union
(Hart 2012).
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If, on the contrary, one employs the term ﬁnalité as ‘a negative check on any
further integration’,152 then the EU would continue to retain certain core
characteristics of an international organization, including importantly that of
attributed powers. Nevertheless, even in a state of arrested integration, the
Union would still be bound to the objectives already present in primary law
and be obliged to pursue them, albeit in a way that would not necessitate
further integration.
What unites these reﬂections on ﬁnalité, as Neil Walker rightly underlines,
both the ones arguing in favour of more and those arguing for less integration,
‘is a somewhat static view of the political community’,153 which also sits rather
uneasily with the evidence of a more dynamic understanding of constitutional
law in general, not only concerning the EU. Even in an allegedly ‘ﬁnal’
politico-legal construct, a constant duty to optimize the set-up of the polity and
its active pursuit of the common good in its various facets continues to exist.
A more nuanced approach to the issue of ﬁnalité and Union objectives
requires distinguishing ‘integration goals’ from substantive constitutional
objectives. Müller-Graﬀ, for instance, identiﬁed in the pre-Lisbon primary
law speciﬁc ‘integration objectives’ (integrationspolitische Ziele).154 For him,
these were the evocation of ‘economic and social cohesion and solidarity
among Member States’155 and the task of the Union ‘to organise, in a manner
demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States
and between their peoples’,156 which has to be viewed in conjunction with the
notion of the ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’.157
This view suggests that further integration would be necessary for the
‘eﬀective’ pursuit of certain other, substantive objectives.158 This entails that
integration tout court is not an end in itself. As Ruﬀert underlines, the goal is
not integration for the sake of integration, but the achievement of certain goals
through integration.159 But integration, then, should be understood rather as a
means to pursue constitutional objectives better—and not the only way, as not
all Union objectives have to be pursued through deeper integration at all times.
Whether more integration is necessary remains a question as to which level
152 Walker (n 146) 1253, who points out the rather diverse positions that have been connected
to ﬁnalité. 153 ibid 1254.
154 P-C Müller-Graﬀ, ‘Verfassungsziele der EG/EU’ in M Dauses (ed), Handbuch des EU-
Wirtschaftsrechts (loose-leaf commentary, 27th edn, CH Beck, October 2010) marginal no 119.
However, the current edition does not include this distinction anymore, Müller-Graﬀ (n 5). Also
P Dollat, Droit européen et droit de l’Union européenne (3rd edn, Sirey 2010) 113 speaks of
‘objectifs politiques internes de l’intégration de l’Union’.
155 Art 2 EC. Note that art 3(3), third subpara TEU uses a slightly diﬀerent formulation
(‘economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States’).
156 Art 1(3) EC; this formulation is not reiterated in the post-Lisbon Treaties.
157 First recital of the preamble TEC; in the Lisbon version, it is referred to in the preambles of
both the TEU and TFEU, as well as in the operative part in art 1(2) TEU.
158 The term ‘eﬀective’ is used here in the sense of ‘goal attainment’, drawing on the deﬁnition
elaborated by O Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless
Society (Cornell University Press 1994) 144–5. 159 Ruﬀert (n 65) marginal no 3.
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of governance oﬀers the best platform for the pursuit of objectives, ie a
question of competence allocation and the use of existing Union competences
as ‘governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’.160 Drawing
again on the terminology of Robert Alexy, integration can be perceived as one
way of ‘optimizing’ the distribution of powers with a view to the most eﬀective
pursuit of constitutional objectives.161 Only in the case where the Union
level would be deemed preferable, yet competences remain wanting, would
questions of conferral of additional powers upon the EU and thus of further
integration arise. This, however, would require suﬃcient political will to make
use of the ﬂexibility clause (Article 352 TFEU) or to amend the Treaties
(Article 48 TEU). Reliance on constitutional aspirations alone, while being
a valid argument in this endeavour, will not suﬃce in itself to bring about
a revamping of the EU and its order of competences.
In sum, the usefulness of the concept of ﬁnalité resides in the potential
for justifying major shifts in the allocation of competences between the Union
and the Member States. However, this leaves unaﬀected the continuous
duty to pursue Union objectives, as they are codiﬁed in the Treaties, within
the existing framework and distribution of powers. Just as any political
community, including States, the EU is under constant pressure to adapt to
forces and developments from both within and without in living up to the goals
enshrined in its highest laws.
VI. CONCLUSION
Having taken the principle of ‘speciality’ from the law of international
organizations as the point of departure, and having contrasted this
subsequently with the widening of the goals of the EU as well as the maturing
of its legal order in the course of history, this article observed a shift in the
position assumed by the objectives enshrined in the highest laws of the Union.
This shift can be summed up in three main points.
First, Union objectives are more numerous and ambitious than ever. There is
nothing ‘functional’ or ‘specialized’ about the EU anymore. Instead of an
international body set up with a speciﬁc task or delimited ﬁeld of activity in
mind, the Treaties now mandate the EU to cater to the general wellbeing of its
citizens, as well as to ‘good global governance’162 in the world at large.
Second, the increased number and audacity of Union objectives notwith-
standing, and because of the ‘thickening’ of the EU legal order, the Union
is less than ever dependent on objectives in order to justify its very
existence. This does not mean that the existential need for objectives—the
160 Art 5(1) TEU. 161 Alexy (n 84) 47.
162 Art 21(2)(h) TEU. On the additional conundrums that this raises, see J Larik, ‘Entrenching
Global Governance: The EU’s constitutional objectives caught between a sanguine world view and
a daunting reality’ in B Van Vooren, S Blockmans and J Wouters (eds), The EU’s Role in Global
Governance: The Legal Dimension (OUP 2013) 7.
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Zielbedarf—has vanished altogether for the EU. As Gráinne de Búrca rightly
argues, ‘the EU in its current state of evolution remains signiﬁcantly dependent
not just on input and output legitimacy, but also on its mission legitimacy.’163
However, as the retracing of the evolution of EU law has shown, while it is not
a State with an overarching Kompetenz-Kompetenz, its legal order has come
to increasingly exhibit constitutional features, including values and funda-
mental rights, which show what the EU stands for, and not merely what it is
to strive after. Most importantly from a legal point of view, in the course of this
‘thickening’ of the legal order, objectives and competences have evolved into
two distinct norm categories in EU law, which is akin to the situation usually
found in national constitutional law. While the former continue to serve an
important purpose for interpreting the Treaties, including at times the outer
contours of competences, on their own they are no source for EU competences.
Instead of creating powers under the rationale of the need to fulﬁl a certain
‘task’, they provide a sense of purpose as to the exercise of these powers
through the structures of the constitutionalized legal order. This interpretive
function is now their hallmark and characterizes their continued signiﬁcance
within the legal order.
Third, as Union objectives on their own cannot create any new powers
for the Union, they equally cannot propel it as a polity towards a particular
‘ﬁnal’ format. The guidance they provide as constitutional principles is
continuous and is to be distinguished from the question of the ultimate form
of the Union, its ﬁnalité. While the eﬀective pursuit of these objectives can
(but does not have to) serve as an argument for more integration, integration for
the sake of integration is certainly not a constitutional objective.
In the Nobel Peace Prize Lecture in December 2012, Commission President
Barroso remarked that European unity ‘is not an end in itself, but a means to
higher ends’.164 These can today be found, rather ﬁttingly, in the highest laws
of the Union—its ‘constitutional charter’. But while these ‘higher ends’ call
upon the EU’s institutions to foster various aspects of the common good, they
are not a call to more power.
163 In this respect, de Búrca (n 66) 36.
164 ‘From war to peace: A European tale’, Nobel Peace Prize Lecture on behalf of the European
Union by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council and José Manuel Durão
Barroso, President of the European Commission, Oslo, 10 December 2012.
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